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Introduction
Every professional sports league in the world, regardless of the sport or the
location of the league, has a specific governance structure that each team or club must
function under. A Governance structure can have either one, a few, or many governance
options under which teams or clubs must operate. Therefore, professional sports leagues
can either employ a standardized approach, which consists of teams with one
homogonous governance structure, or a mixed approach where teams or clubs can choose
from various governance structures.1
There are three traditional governance structures in which a team can operate
under: privately owned firm (true capitalist), public football corporation, and a non-profit
firm (member association). The pros and cons of each form of club ownership will be
discussed and analyzed later in this paper. The form of governance a team or club
employs is very significant insofar as it determines who has the residual control and
residual claim of the club.
The German Bundesliga, the major football (soccer) league in Germany, employs
a mixed club ownership approach where clubs can choose their governance structure.
Currently each of the three governance structures is utilized by clubs in the league. The
focus of this paper is to determine which form of club ownership allows for the most
efficient output of a team. Each governance structure has a unique impact on a club’s
financial results. A club’s financial results have a direct impact on that club’s available
funds and therefore, ultimately determine a club’s spending power. Furthermore, due to
the way modern football has developed through commercialization of the game, a strong
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correlation between spending power and success has been found because more available
funds allow a team to buy more skilled players. Therefore, there is a strong link between
a club’s governance structure, spending power, and success.
To determine the relative financial strength and ultimate spending power derived
from each form of club ownership a theoretical model has been employed. In order to
analyze this case, the following three inputs are utilized in the model: influence of club
governance structure on the capability to access capital from investors to increase
spending power, influence of club governance structure on the capability to channel
profits into spending power, and influence of club governance structure on the capability
to collect revenues through sponsorship to increase spending power. Ultimately, based
on the inputs applied in the theoretical model and given the context of the German
Bundesliga, the form of governance that has the greatest influence on a club’s spending
power is derived from a non-profit firm (member association).
Background Information
The landscape of professional football is always evolving. In the last 20 years,
commercialization and globalization of the game have led to some significant
developments. Such developments are both general and specific in manner; the former
pertaining to football globally and the latter relevant only in the context of German
football.
The transformation of football into a lucrative industry has occurred rapidly in the
modern era as a result of technological advancement, most notably the internet and T.V.
broadcasting. Such advancements have created a worldwide audience for the top
European football leagues. Thus T.V. and internet broadcasting contracts generate a very
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significant portion of a club’s revenue. Deloitte, a global accounting firm, reports an
annual publication profiling football’s highest earning clubs called the “Deloitte Football
Money League 2011.” According to the 2011 edition, Barcelona, Manchester United and
Bayern Munich – examples of some of the most well known on the list – had
broadcasting revenue of €178.1 million, €128.0 million, and €83.4 million respectively.
For the three clubs such broadcasting revenues made up 44%, 37%, and 26% of total
revenues respectively.2 Such broadcasting revenues are a direct result of new technology
and are a relatively new source of revenue for clubs; however, such revenues make up a
substantial portion of a club’s total revenues. Furthermore, within the last 20 years
football broadcasting contracts have grown greatly in value due to increased worldwide
demand. With that said, clubs now have a much larger budget, which gives them more
funds to spend on player talent.
The game of football functions in a contest structure where winning is of utmost
importance. The focus of winning goes well beyond the desire to win and the glory from
winning but rather, given the structure of the system, winning can lead to qualification to
even more contests and ultimately more money. For example the top three teams in the
Bundesliga automatically qualify for the Champions League3 the following year. Along
those same lines, the Bundesliga T.V. contract revenues are not split evenly between the
18 clubs but rather revenues are divided based on league standings at the end of the year.
Given the current environment in football and contests in general, a team’s focus
is to win in order to increase revenues. But in order to increase revenues it is inherent
that clubs expenditures must also increase. In the contest of a football match the only
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way to create a competitive advantage against an opposing team is to have a more skilled
and talented team; the caliber of players is what sets teams apart. A club’s spending
power is the main driver in creating a competitive advantage over other teams, as more
available funds allows a team to buy more skilled players. In result, the contest structure
inherent in football has led to the overinvestment theory, in which teams overspend on
talent (players) because the potential profits tied to winning exceed the costs (of players).
Teams are looking to outspend their opponents in order to field a better squad for the sake
of winning. Under this new paradigm a team’s spending power becomes vital to that
team’s success on the field.
Also vital to understanding the argument in this paper, is knowledge of the
German Bundesliga and how it has developed. The Bundesliga was founded in 1963 and
until 2000 the league employed a standardized approach consisting of teams with a
homogonous form of governance. All teams operated as a “Verein”, which when
translated in German means member association. Also, during that time, all clubs
operated as non-profits, were free of owners, and were controlled by a board of members
whom were voted on by fans/members. However, in 2000, amidst pressure to be more
competitive and conform to be like other leagues in Europe, the league evolved into a
mixed governance structure system. The new system allowed each team to choose their
form of governance. Three forms of governance were available to clubs, the original
member association – non-profit (Verein)4, public football corporation, and a privately
owned firm. However, along with the new system came one stipulation known as the
50% + 1 Rule. This rule forced all clubs, regardless of governance structure to give the
members of the club 50% + 1 vote of control. However, the Deutsche Fußball Liga
4
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(DFL) did allow for one exception to the 50% + 1 rule; any corporation/owner may be
awarded a stake of ownership greater than 50% if the corporation/owner has substantially
funded the club continually for at least 20 years and the DFL believes the
owner/corporation will continue to support the club to at least the same extent as before.5
In result, a truly capitalistic privately owned firm without the 50% + 1 tile became a
fourth form of governance available to teams in the Bundesliga. This form of governance
will be referred to as a true-private firm, and clubs that are privately owned but operate
under the 50% + 1 rule will be referred to as semi-private.
As we can see, in the past 20 years significant developments have occurred in the
context of football both in Germany and globally. These developments establish a basis
of understanding of the current environment of German football, which will allow for a
more in depth comprehension of how a club’s governance structure impacts a club’s
spending power.
Review of Literature
Significant research, spearheaded by two individuals, Helmut Dietl and Egon
Franck, has already been made on the influence of club governance structure. One of
their most notable works, Governance Failure and Financial Crisis in German Football,
outlines the ineffectiveness of the 50% + 1 rule. Work from these two scholars has been
of significant value for of this paper.
Egon Franck has written many significant pieces and has greatly contributed to
the literature. His papers, Professional Sports Clubs and Business Enterprises – A
Comparative analysis of Governance Structures in Football and Private Firm, Public
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Corporation or Member’s Association Governance Structures in European Football,
were ground breaking pieces that gave great insight into the pros and cons of various
governance structures.
In Helmut Dietl, Markus Lang, and Stephan Werner’s Social Welfare in Sports
Leagues with Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing Clubs, significant contributions
have been made to develop an understanding of mixed and homogenous leagues as well
as the differences between profit-maximizing and win-maximizing clubs.
In addition to these, other scholars have contributed to the literature. In Helmut
Dietl and Christian Weingartner’s The Effect of Professional Football Clubs’ Legal
Structure on Sponsoring Revenue, the idea for input three took shape. In their paper the
authors develop a framework as to how various legal structures impact sponsoring
revenues. This idea has been reworked in the theoretical model yet to come and has been
applied to the context of the German Bundesliga.
A more recent publication by Max Kinder, Football Club Ownership in England
and Germany – The Effectiveness and Lawfulness of the “50 plus 1 rule” and what
Germany can learn from England, has shed light on the differences in governance
between Germany and England and what that means for clubs in both countries.
Overall, a great deal of research has been done on the topic and as a result the
focus of this paper will be to apply such research to the context of the German
Bundesliga.
Economic Theory
In each of the various governance structures different parties have different
incentives that impact their utility function. Therefore, to help demonstrate how utility is
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derived for an owner, an anonymous shareholder, and a fan, three graphs will be
employed.
Figure 1 depicts the indifference curve of an owner in a semi-private firm and
true-private firm. For an owner utility is derived from profits as well as public
admiration from
Figure 1

sporting success.
Therefore, an owner
maximizes utility by
pursuing both profits as
well as public
admiration. As seen in
Figure 1, the owner

pursues an indifference curve furthest in the preference direction. With that said, a
rational owner in both privately owned firms, 50% + 1 and true capitalistic, will allocate
some level of profits toward spending power in order to increase a club’s winning
percentage. Finally, an owner will take such action in order to maximize utility.
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Figure 2 (below) illustrates the indifference curve of an anonymous shareholder in
a public corporation. In
Figure 2
such a governance
structure an anonymous
shareholder only derives
utility from profits, most
notably in the form of
dividends. A
shareholder is not concerned about the sporting success of a club rather a shareholder
only cares about the rate of return from such an investment. A shareholder will only buy
stock when an investment warrants a desirable rate of return. Thus, an anonymous
shareholder will keep all profits and thus has a horizontal or flat indifference curve
furthest in their preference direction. The only way to increase utility for an anonymous
shareholder is to increase profits.
Figure 3 shows the indifference curve of a fan in a member association. In this
governance structure all profits are put directly back into the club, as there are no owners
Figure 3

or investors. Given
this, a fan cannot gain
utility from profits.
Rather, a fan can only
gain utility from the
sporting success and
winning percentage of
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their club. Therefore the indifference curve of a single fan is vertical furthest in their
preference direction. The only way a fan can increase their utility is if the club increases
their winning percentage.
Model
To determine the impact that governance and club structure has on a team’s
spending power a theoretical model has been employed. There are four various
governance structures available to teams in the German Bundesliga: Semi-private firm,
True-private firm, Public Corporation, and member association. In the model three
different inputs will be analyzed: influence of club governance structure on the capability
to access capital from investors to increase spending power, influence of club governance
structure on the capability to channel profits into spending power, and influence of club
governance structure on the capability to collect revenues through sponsorship to increase
spending power. Through such analysis of the employed model the member association
governance structure type will be deemed the best option when trying increase spending
power.
Input 1: Influence of club governance structure on the capability to access capital from
investors to increase spending power.
In a semi-private firm, the owner has the residual claims, but the member
association has residual control. In this governance structure the amount of capital
invested into the team is at the owner’s discretion. However, the owner has no control
where the capital is invested. For example, since the member association has residual
control, the board, which is made up of fans, decides how to allocate the team’s funds;
meaning which players to pursue, and how much wages are, among many other things.
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The owner therefore may be hesitant when investing capital in the club. This form of
governance creates dysfunctional incentives for the owner who puts up the capital for the
team but does not have control over how it is spent. Still, the board must keep the owner
happy or the owner will stop investing. In conclusion, the semi-private firm form of
governance has a positive influence on spending power if the board has a positive
relationship with the owner and can easily acquire capital when necessary, however, it
should be noted the owner’s and board’s interest may not align
For the other true-private firm, the owner has residual control as well as residual
claims. In this governance structure, like the semi-private firm, the spending power is
tied to the amount of capital the owner is willing to put up. However, since the owner
has both residual control and residual claims the owner does not have dysfunctional
incentives. Rather it is reasonable to think that an owner will invest in talent. For an
owner utility is derived from profits, a team’s winning percentage and being accepted by
society. An owner has an incentive to invest capital into the team to increase spending
power because the more a team spends on talent the higher chance that team has of
winning.6 Furthermore, as a team’s winning percentage increases so will the club’s
profits. In addition, the higher a team’s winning percentage the more society will accept
and honor the owner. Therefore, an owner has an incentive to increase spending power
to a level in which the owner will maximize utility. In summary, the true-private firm
form of governance has a positive influence on a club’s spending power.
Another form of governance for clubs is a public corporation. In this governance
structure a club can easily acquire capital and raise funds through issuing shares of stock
6
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to investors. The German Bundesliga club Brussia Dortmund operates as a public
corporation and had an initial public offering (IPO) in October of 2000.7 Whenever
management wants to raise more capital they can issue more shares to investors, which
results in a positive influence on spending power.
The final governance structure that needs to be assessed is the member
association. In this governance structure a club is run by a board of members, comprised
of fans. Clubs that operate as member associations do not have owners or investors, and
therefore such clubs have no outside source of capital. Therefore, this form of
governance does not allow a club the ability to access capital from investors to increase
spending power and in turn does not have a positive influence on spending power.
By, analyzing the first input in the model, influence of club governance structure
on the capability to access capital from investors to increase spending power, some
noteworthy conclusions can be made. First, the member association form of governance
lacks owners and investors, resulting in a club’s inability to access capital from outside
sources to increase spending power. Next, the least effective form of governance in
capturing the capability to access capital from investors to increase spending power is the
semi-private firm. This form of governance creates dysfunctional incentives for the
owner and may lead to a situation where the owner limits or stops injecting capital into
the club altogether. This is a likely issue since the owner does not control how capital is
spent. However, this form of governance can at times have a very positive influence on a
team’s spending power, when the owner and board have a healthy relationship and the
owner is willing to give the board a sufficient level of funds. Altogether this legal
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structure’s impact on spending power is in question as it ultimately depends on the
situation and relationship between the board and the owner/s. The remaining two forms
of governance, public corporation and true-private firm, are the most effective
governance structures as they positively impact a club’s spending power. It is unclear
which of these two governance structures has a greater influence on a club’s spending
power, as the degree of influence completely depends on the situation for a given team.
Input 2: Influence of club governance structure on the capability to channel profits into
spending power.
In a semi-private firm, the owner has residual claims and therefore receives all
profits; the members on the club’s board have residual control. Under this governance
structure, the owner does not have the authority to allocate funds specifically towards
player purchases; thus meaning the owner cannot directly increase a team’s spending
power. Only the board of members can allocate funds to a club’s spending power.
However, an owner can indirectly impact a team’s spending power. Given that an owner
derives utility from public admiration, it is reasonable to assume an owner will allocate
some of their profits back into the team, however, this may not be the case as for an
owner. Furthermore, since a board is only focused on a club’s sporting success and the
glory derived from such success the board will allocate capital to increase a club’s
spending power. The rationale for this action is that a greater spending power will
increase a club’s winning percentage and ultimately help the board achieve a higher level
of utility. Therefore, this form of governance can have a positive influence on a team’s
spending power if both the owner and board have a healthy relationship and the board
can easily acquire capital from the owner.
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In the other true-private firm, the owner has residual control as well as residual
claims resulting in profit allocation at the owner’s discretion. An owner of a football
team derives utility from profits as well as public admiration. Given that a football match
is an entertainment product to fans, an owner’s utility derived from public admiration is
open for public debate and will largely depend on a team’s sporting success. In turn, this
governance structure creates an incentive for owners to trade some profits to increase
spending power in order to boost the club’s winning percentage and ultimately enhance
the public admiration for the owner.
A third legal structure is a public corporation where the shareholder’s are the
residual claimants and the members on the board hold residual control. The residual
claimants in a public corporation are a bit different than the residual claimants in the
other governance structures. In this governance structure a typical shareholder holds a
small share in the corporation, is anonymous, and assumes no other role in the firm other
than that of a passive investor.8 Therefore, shareholders only derive utility from profits.
Unlike the residual claimants in other governance structures, public admiration from
sporting success has no direct channel into the utility function of an anonymous
shareholder. In turn, this governance structure does not result in profits being channeled
back into spending power; thus the shareholders’ gain no utility from a team’s sporting
success and have no reason to allocate their profits toward spending power.
Lastly, the member association form of governance needs to be assessed. Given
that a non-profit entity must uphold the non-distribution constraint it is inherent in such a
club’s structure that the club will be forced to reinvest all profits back into the club. For a
8
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member association the only way to derive utility is through winning. Given that the
underlying objective of such a club is to win, the board of a member association is only
focused on glory and their club’s sporting success and in turn the board will allocate
profits to increase spending power. Therefore, the non-profit governance structure leads
to the greatest increase in spending power since profits can only be put back into the club,
and given the board’s objective nearly all profits will be used to increase spending power.
By analyzing the second input in the model, influence of club governance
structure on the capability to channel profits into spending power, a few significant
findings can drawn. First, the public corporation form of governance has a negative
impact on the capability to channel profits into spending power because the residual
claimants are shareholders and only gain utility from profits and therefore have no
incentive to allocate profits to increase spending power. The semi-private firm and the
true-private firm forms of governance have a very similar influence on the capability to
channel profits into spending power, however the mechanics leading to the eventual
outcome differ in the two forms of governance. In each form of governance the owner
wants to increase spending power to a level that maximizes utility; for an owner utility is
derived through profits, their club’s winning percentage and public admiration. In a
semi-private firm, the allocation of capital to a specific part of the club falls to the board,
not the owner, who in turn must allocate capital to the board. However, in the trueprivate firm the owner has residual control as well as residual claims and can therefore
distribute capital at their own discretion. Overall, both forms of governance, semi-private
firm and true-private firm, will have a positive impact on the capability to channel profits
into spending power given an owners incentive to increase spending power and
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ultimately increase utility. The evidence suggests that the most influential governance
structure on the capability to channel profits into spending power is the member
association. This form of governance has the greatest impact on a clubs spending power
due to the non-distribution constraint. Given that this form of governance has no residual
claimants all profits will be invested back into the club. Furthermore, since the boards
underlying objective is to win given the boards utility function, a great deal of profits will
be used to increase a team’s spending power.
Input 3: Influence of club governance structure on the capability to collect revenues
through sponsorship to increase spending power.
Prior to analysis of the third input background information on sponsorship is
necessary. The goals of a sponsor are to increase market share, generate additional
revenue, and to obtain the attention of potential customers. Therefore the greater
attention a sponsor receives from a club the higher the payout is for the club. In addition,
the amount of attention a sponsor receives is driven by the number of fans and the extent
of the media coverage. Consequently, sponsoring a club has inherent risks; therefore the
sponsor aims for a secure investment for their capital expenditure. The sponsor also aims
for an investment that will not result in any hold up situation; a hold up situation is where
a problem arises and thus a fan must choose to continue to support the club or not. A
hold up situation will result in lost attention for a sponsor and is there for
disadvantageous. Finally, there are three factors that determine which form of governance
is most attractive to a sponsor.
Factor 1: The effect of the allocation of the right of residual control.
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Regarding factor 1, the member association, is the most favorable form of
governance for a sponsor for a few reasons. First, a sponsor seeks to invest in a club
where no policy can be made to deter fans. Given that in a member association residual
control is with the board, which is made up of fans, this form of governance secures no
policy will be made to deter fans and thus protects the fans interests. Second, member
associations are focused on win maximization and therefore drive attention for the
sponsor. This form of governance effectively utilizes the fans’ voice or opinion. Third,
fans can impact all major decisions thus preventing hold up problems for fans and
increases fan loyalty. A fan’s voice in a member association is positive for the sponsor as
fan’s will argue for the lowest ticket price which in turn will lead to an increase in
spectators. The same logic is true for T.V. broadcasting. Fans will strive to get the most
widely used broadcasting deal since the fans are concerned about maximizing their
utility. Such a T.V. broadcasting deal would focus on maximizing free coverage of
games for fans. Once again the greater the T.V. audience the more attention a sponsor
will receive. In conclusion, this form of governance given its focus on win maximization
is most in sync with the objectives of a sponsor. Therefore a member association is the
most favorable form of governance for a sponsor.
There are several key reasons why the other forms of governance are less suitable
for a sponsor. In a public corporation form the focus is profit maximization. In both
governance structures dealing with privately owned firms, 50% + 1 and true capitalistic,
the focus is a combination of win maximization as well as profit maximization. In all
these three forms of governance the board/owner is concerned about winning but also has
to consider profits. Therefore in these governance structures the board/owner would not
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push for low ticket prices or free coverage of games for fans because such changes would
not increase revenues. Also these three forms of governance can lead to the following
hold up problems for fans. Since the board/owner has residual control they can initiate
hold up attacks against the fans such as selling the club’s best players. Such an action by
the board/owner may result in high short term profits but a poor competitive
performance. Rational fans will acknowledge the possibility of such actions and
consciously or subconsciously refuse to invest increased loyalty with the club.
Therefore, with regard to factor 1, in these three forms of governance there is some
element of profit maximization so sponsors are better off focusing their efforts towards
member association clubs.
Factor 2: The effect of the allocation of the right to residual claim.
In light of factor 2, the member association form of governance structure is most
suitable for sponsors for a few reasons. A member association operates as a non-profit
and therefore there is no residual claimant. The lack of a residual claimant decreases the
risk of hold up problems for a sponsor. Also the limited risk of hold up problems will
result in greater attention from the fans due to increased loyalty. Additionally, the nondistribution constraint, inherent in this legal structure, allows such a club the option to
invest all profits into playing strength which leads to win maximization. Further, a
stronger team will lead to greater sporting success and will ultimately increase the
spectator base and coverage for the team, which in turn will lead to more attention for the
sponsor. In this legal structure the absence of holdups leads to network mobilization,
most notably on the fan side, which again leads to greater attention for the sponsor.
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Finally, with respect to factor 2, the non-distribution constraint of a member association
offers more advantages to the club and sponsor, making it the ideal form of governance.
Once again, there are several reasons why the other legal structures, public
corporation and both privately owned firms, are less attractive to a sponsor. In each of
remaining governance structures there is a residual claimant, be it an owner or a
shareholder. Therefore, when a sponsor issues sponsorship revenues to a club there are
worries that such revenues are being given to the owner or shareholders. This creates a
competitive disadvantage in comparison to a member association because funds may not
be invested back into the playing strength of a team. Also because there is a residual
claimant, ticket prices for clubs operating as a public corporation or either version of the
privately owned firm may be raised in an effort to increase profits for an
owner/shareholder. Higher ticket prices may result in a loss of fans, which correlates
directly to lost attention for a sponsor. In conclusion, with reference to factor 2, by
taking into consideration that these three forms of governance have residual claimants it
is in a sponsor’s best interest to pursue contracts with clubs that operate as a member
association.
Factor 3: The effect of the allocation of the transfer right.
In connection with factor 3 the member association legal structure is most fitting
for a sponsor for a few reasons. First, in such a legal structure there is no owner or
person that has the majority of shares meaning no individual has property rights of a club.
Second, in a member association “the president is elected by the fans, and ownership
changes are impossible due to legal restrictions. This eliminates the possibility for rapid
strategy changes, which could result in hold up attacks against a sponsor who had signed
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a long-term contract.”9 However, in a public corporation ownership can change very
quickly as someone may acquire the majority of shares. The same could happen in both
versions of a privately owned firm, as a club may be sold to a new owner. In both
instances, the person in control might sell the top players or stop recruiting youth,
nevertheless such changes could result in decreased fan support or negative media
attention. All in all, with regard to factor 3, a member association form of governance is
most advantageous for a sponsor because ownership cannot quickly change and therefore
the negatives that can occur in other legal structures will not happen in a member
association.
Through analysis of input 3, with regard to the three factors makes the member
association form of governance the obvious best fit and choice for a sponsor. Given that
a member association is focused on win maximization, operates under the nondistribution constraint, and ownership cannot change hands, the member association legal
structure will achieve the highest level of sponsorship revenues from a sponsor. With
that in mind, this form of governance has the greatest capability to collect revenues
through sponsorship to increase a club’s spending power.
Results
After analyzing the employed model significant results can be concluded. With
respect to the first input, influence of club governance structure on the capability to
access capital from investors to increase spending power, it is concluded that the public
corporation and true-private firm, are the most effective governance structures as they
positively impact a club’s spending power. However, given the theoretical nature of this
9
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paper, it is undeterminable which of these two governance structures has a greater
influence on a club’s spending power, as the degree of influence completely depends on
the situation for a given team.
With regard to the second input, influence of club governance structure on the
capability to channel profits into spending power, it is found that the member association
form of governance has the greatest impact on a club’s spending power.
With reference to the third and final input, influence of club governance structure
on the capability to collect revenues through sponsorship to increase spending power, it is
determined that once again, the member association form of governance has the most
significant affect on a club’s spending power.
Finally, it is concluded that after employing the theoretical model, the member
association, form of governance has the greatest influence on a club’s spending power.
This decision was reached in light of the fact that two of the possible three inputs
concluded that this form of governance was optimal to increase a club’s spending power
Conclusion
In the German Bundesliga a unique environment has taken shape. Given the
history and culture of German football, the legal framework that has developed for clubs
to function under is very different than in other European countries. The most notable
difference is the 50% + 1 rule established in 2000. With respect to this rule the form of
governance that has the greatest impact on a club’s spending power is the member
association. Given the employed model, theoretically, the member association form of
governance should have the greatest influence on spending power and ultimately teams
with this legal structure should have the most on field success. This structure is very
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advantageous because of the non-distribution constraint; all profits are invested back into
the club. Additionally, a member association is optimal in the context of Germany, since
the 50% + 1 rule deters ultra wealthy owners from entering the German platform.
However, when applied to the broader context of Europe the member association
may not be favorable. In European countries such as England, Italy, and Spain where
50% + 1 rule does not exist ultra wealthy investors are attracted. Therefore, in the bigger
picture of Europe other forms of governance such as a true-private firm may have a
greater impact on a club’s spending power as a result of ultra wealthy owners. In result
given German teams do compete against clubs from other countries in Europe via the
Champions League among other competitions it may be in the best interest of football
clubs in Germany to abolish the 50% + 1 rule to level the playing field and thus attract
ultra wealthy investors into Germany. In conclusion, the German platform claims that
the 50% + 1 rule is advantageous for fans as it drives ticket prices down among other
things. However, if this rule hinders German teams from attracting ultra wealth investors
and in result weakens German clubs in international competitions is this rule really in the
best interest of the fans?

23
Bibliography
Andreff, Wladimir, and Stefan Szymanski. Handbook on the economics of sport.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006. Print.
DFL Deutsche FuBball. "Bundesliga Report 2011: The economic state of professional
football." Bundesliga. DFL Deutsche FuBball Liga GmbH, 20 Jan. 2011. Web.
15 Nov. 2012.
<static.bundesliga.de/media/native/autosync/dfl_bl_report_2011_fin_150dpi_eng
lisch.pdf>.
Dietl , Helmut M., Markus Lang, and Stephan Werner. "Social Welfare in Sports Leagues
with Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing Clubs." Southern Economic
Journal 76.2 (2009): 375-396. EconLit. Web. 19 Oct. 2011.
Dietl, Helmut, and Christian Weingartner. "The Effect of Professional Football Clubs'
Legal Structure on Sponsoring Revenue." IDEAS: Economics and Finance
Research. University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics
(ISU), n.d. Web. 5 Dec. 2012.
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/iso/wpaper/0141.html#biblio>.
Dietl, Helmut. M, and Egon Franck. "Governance Failure and Financial Crisis in German
Football." Journal of Sports Economics 8.6 (2007): 662-669. EconLit. Web. 19
Oct. 2011.
Dobson, Stephen, and John A. Goddard. The economics of football. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.
Franck, Egon. "Professional sports clubs and business enterprises â€“ a comparative
analysis of governance structures in football." Scientific Commons. Institute for
Strategy and Business Economics - University of Zurich, n.d. Web. 7 Jan. 2012.

24

<en.scientificcommons.org/51694017>.
Franck, Egon. "Private Firm, Public Corporation of Memberâ€™s Association
Governance Structures in European Football." International Journal of Sports
Fiance 5.2 (2010): 108-127. EconLit. Web. 24 Oct. 2011.
Frick, Bernd, and Joachim Prinz. "Crisis? What Crisis? Football in Germany." Journal of
Sports Economics 7.1 (2006): 60-75. Journal of Sports Economics. Web. 19 Oct.
2011.
Haas, Dieter, Martin G. Kocher , and Matthia Sutter. "Measuring Efficiency of German
Football Teams by Data Envelopment Analysis." Central European Journal of
Operations Research 12 (2004): 1-21. Google Scholar. Web. 19 Oct. 2011.
Kindler, Max. Football club ownership in England and Germany: The effectiveness and
lawfulness of "50 plus 1 rule" and what Germany can learn from England..
MuÌˆnchen: GRIN Verlag, 2008. Print.
Muller, Christian. "Football Governance." United Kingdom Parliament home page. UK
Parliment, 21 Feb. 2011. Web. 9 Mar. 2012.
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmcumeds/write
v/792/fg84.htm>.
RodriÌ•guez, PlaÌ•cido. Governance and competition in professional sports leagues.
Spain: Universidad de Oviedo, 2007. Print.
Sports Business Group. "The Untouchables Football Money League." Deloitte. N.p., n.d.
Web. 5 Nov. 2011. <www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20
Group/UK_SBG_DFML2011.pdf>.

